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MODAL LOGIC
Abstract
It is well known that no consistent normal modal logic contains (as theorems)
both ♦A and ♦¬A (for any formula A). Here we observe that this claim can be
strengthened to the following: for any formula A, either no consistent normal
modal logic contains ♦A, or else no consistent normal modal logic contains ♦¬A.
1. Introduction
We work with the standard language of (propositional) monomodal logic,
for convenience taken to have a countable stock of sentence letters, pi,
constants (0-ary connectives) ⊤ and ⊥ among the Boolean connectives,
alongside others together functionally complete (we use ¬, ∧, ∨, → and ↔
below for the Boolean connectives commonly so notated), and for definite-
ness, the 1-ary connective  (with ♦A defined as ¬¬A). A pure formula is
one not containing any sentence letters (such as ⊥ ∨ ♦⊥). Here modal
logics are treated as sets of formulas, and we are interested specifically
in normal modal logics, i.e. such sets as contain every truth-functional
tautology in the Boolean connectives as well as all formulas of the form
(A→ B)→ (A→ B), and are closed under Modus Ponens, Uniform
Substitution (of arbitrary formulas for sentence letters), and Necessitation
(the rule taking us from A to A).
Let us recall the status of Porte’s rule (from [11]):
♦A ∧ ♦¬A
⊥
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in this setting. Porte observed that (the set of theorems of) S5 was closed
under this rule – which appears somewhat differently notated as (R5) on
p. 417 of [11] – and others (such as Fagin et al. [4]) have noted that the same
goes for all normal modal logics. Since the inconsistent logic is obviously
closed under the rule, it suffices to establish that all consistent normal
modal logics are, which can be done by noting that every such logic is a
sublogic of one of the two Post complete modal logics: that containing
A ↔ A for all A (“the trivial system”), or that containing A for all A
(“the Verum system”). Where S ⊕ X denotes the smallest normal modal
logic extending S and containing all formulas A ∈ X and K is, as usual, the
smallest normal modal logic, then the latter system can alternatively be
described as K ⊕ {⊥}. Since no formula of the form ♦A ∧ ♦¬A belongs
to either of these logics, no such formula belongs to any consistent normal
modal logic.
Alternatively, one may draw the same conclusion semantically using
either algebraic or model-theoretic semantics for modal logic. In the former
case (as in Makinson [8]) one considers normal modal expansions of the two-
element Boolean algebra,1 noting that neither can validate any formula
of the form ♦A ∧ ♦¬A, and in the latter via a consideration (as in van
Benthem [2], Lemma 2.19, p. 31) of the special status of the two one-point
Kripke frames, again neither of them validating a formula of the form in
question.
The consistent normal modal logics are thus closed under Porte’s rule
because the rule is, as one says, vacuously admissible: no such logic contains
any candidate premiss for an application of the rule. We can put this
another way, rewriting the rule as a two-premiss rule, with premisses ♦A
and ♦¬A, and concentrating on K since the existence of some consistent
normal modal logic containing such and such formulas is equivalent to the
consistency of the normal extension of K by those formulas. The familiar
point associated with Porte’s rule is then:
For all formulas A, K ⊕ {♦A,♦¬A} is inconsistent. (*)
By an elementary argument given in the following section, we show that a
considerable strengthening of this point is available:
1The notion of normality for a modal algebra used here is that defined in Blok and
Ko¨hler, p. 943.
An Observation Concerning Porte’s Rule in Modal Logic 27
For all formulas A, either K ⊕ {♦A} or K ⊕ {♦¬A}, is inconsistent.(**)
Thus, reverting to Porte’s conjunctive form, the inconsistency of a nor-
mal modal logic S containing any formula ♦A∧♦¬A can always be ‘blamed
on’ one of the conjuncts and is never due to any interaction between them
(or to any interaction between them and whatever else is in S other than
what is already in K).
2. Justifying the Stronger Claim
The present section is devoted to establishing the observation (**) above.
It is a well known fact that the logic KD ( = K ⊕ ♦⊤) contains, for every
pure formula B, either B itself or else ¬B; we will put this by saying that
KD decides every pure formula. (See the first part of the proof of Theorem
1 in [15].)
With a view to showing that for any formula A, either K ⊕ {♦A} or
K ⊕ {♦¬A} is inconsistent, fix on one such A and note that each of these
logics extends KD. Let B be any pure substitution instance of A and note
that
(1) ♦B ∈ K⊕ {♦A} (2) ♦¬B ∈ K⊕ {♦¬A}.
Now, since B is a pure formula and KD decides each such formula we have
B ∈ KD or ¬B ∈ KD. In the first case, therefore, B ∈ KD (by normality)
while in the second case we have ¬B ∈ KD. Since each of K ⊕ {♦A},
K ⊕ {♦¬A} ⊇ KD, we therefore have either ¬B ∈ K ⊕ {♦A}, showing
K ⊕ {♦A} to be inconsistent in view of (1), or else B ∈ K ⊕ {♦¬A},
showing K⊕{♦¬A} to be inconsistent in view of (2). Thus one or other of
these extensions of K is inconsistent, as (**) claims.
3. Enriching the Language
It is worth asking what becomes of (*) and (**) in the setting of bimodal
logic, i.e., when there are two primitive non-Boolean connectives instead of
one. Consider the case of tense logic, in which each of the two operators –
we shall write them as  and −1 here – is 1-ary, and satisfies the normality
conditions given in connection with  in Section 1, as well as the ‘Lemmon
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bridging axioms’, all formulas of the form ♦−1A→ A and ♦−1A→ A.
(Here ♦−1 abbreviates ¬−1¬; , ♦, −1 and ♦−1 are often written, in
a notation due to A. N. Prior, as G, F , H and P respectively.) The basic
tense logic Kt is smallest set of formulas in this language satisfying these
conditions, and we can ask about the fate of (*) and (**) for Kt rather
than monomodal K. Naturally one could focus on ♦−1 rather than ♦ in
pursuing this question but in view of the symmetrical treatment of the two
operators in Kt there is nothing to be gained by doing so. When discussing
extensions of a logic S in this language, S⊕X denotes the smallest extension
of S containing all formulas in X and in which each of ,−1 satisfies the
normality conditions.
As is well known, frames for (i.e., validating every formula in) Kt can
be presented with a single accessibility relation, taken as interpreting ,
with −1 interpreted by its converse. Such frames reveal a contrast with
the monomodal case:
Proposition 3.1. The claim resulting from (∗∗) by putting “Kt” for “K”
is false.
Proof: We need to supply a formula A for which each of K ⊕ {♦A},
K ⊕ {♦¬A}, is consistent. Take A as −1♦−1⊤. Thus we can write ¬A
as ♦−1−1⊥. To see that Kt ⊕ {♦A} is consistent, note that the one-




– is a frame
for this logic. In the case of Kt ⊕ {♦¬A} consider, instead, the frame〈
{0, 1}, {〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 1〉}
〉
.
The choice of A in the proof just given refutes the tense-logical ana-
logue of (**) but not that of (*), since from ♦A, i.e., ♦−1♦−1⊤, by one
of the bridging axioms (and Modus Ponens) we get ♦−1⊤, from which Ne-
cessitation (w.r.t. −1 and then, after that, ) delivers −1♦⊤, which
is equivalent to A, making the envisaged extension by both {♦A,♦¬A}
inconsistent. But must the same happen, as it does in the monomodal case,
for all possible choices of A? That is:
Question. Is (*) correct for Kt in place of K?
A remark spanning pages 712 and 713 in Segerberg [15] (and echoed in the
bottom paragraph of p. 135 of [6]) suggests that the answer to this question
may be negative, but we have no definite information.
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A simpler extension of the language of monomodal logic would involve
the addition of a non-Boolean sentential constant. As has recently been
observed ([5], [6]) adding such a constant κ makes for considerable changes
to standard metatheoretical results familiar from the straight monomodal
case, and indeed the multimodal-with-all-operators-normal case. We can
use our constant by considering the smallest modal logic in this language in
which  obeys the normality conditions and which also contains, in order
to contain a candidate premiss for Porte’s rule, the axiom ♦κ ∧ ♦¬κ. If
the notion of normality is extended in a natural way to other than 1-ary
connectives (see Schotch and Jennings [14], p. 271, where the definition
given is credited to unpublished work of Goldblatt), this would be counted
as a bimodal logic in which  but not κ was normal. (The latter would
require, by the appropriate generalization of Necessitation, that κ itself
belong to the logic.) The conclusion, ⊥, of an application of Porte’s rule to
this new axiom clearly does not belong to the logic, which contains exactly
the formulas (and ⊥ is not one of them) valid on all frames 〈W,R,W0〉
with R ⊆W ×W and W0 ⊆W satisfies the condition (in which we denote
by R(x) the set of y ∈ W such that Rxy) that for all x ∈ W , R(x) ∩
W0 6= ∅ and R(x) ∩ (W rW0) 6= ∅, truth in a model being defined with
the condition that κ is true precisely at elements of W0. (Validity on a
frame is truth throughout W in every model on the frame.) The axiom
tells us that it is contingent whether κ, and was used by Anderson in an
early version (see note 40 of [1]) of his reduction of deontic logic to alethic
modal logic – using κ to record the violation of an obligation so that “it
ought to be that A” could be thought of as (¬A → κ). More recently,
Pizzi ([9], [10]) has used a similar idea to define necessity – understood as
subsuming any interpretation of the  operator – in terms of contingency
(or noncontingency), even in logics too weak to allow for a definition of 
in terms of ▽ (“it is contingent whether”). Of course, given the change
of primitives, he writes the above axiom as ▽κ rather than ♦κ ∧ ♦¬κ,
but shows how to use κ alongside ▽ in an explicit definition of  even in
these weaker logics. For a review of this project, see [7], esp. Section 4,
where further references and a contrast with a different kind of contingency
constant (used by Meredith and Prior) may be found.2 The reason for
2Pizzi [10] is there referred to as ‘Relative Contingency and Multimodal Logics,’ its
working title as of the time of writing. The bottom paragraph of p. 1296 in [7] seems
to suggest that Prior [12] had observed that without the addition of a new constant
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giving this example here is simply to show that there are naturally arising
extensions of the basic monomodal apparatus in which  remains normal
but Porte’s rule ceases to be admissible.
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